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We use Bayesian methods to estimate two models of post WWII U.S. inflation rates with drifting stochastic
volatility and drifting coefficients. One model is univariate, the other a multivariate autoregression.
We define the inflation gap as the deviation of inflation from a pure random walk component of inflation
and use both of our models to study changes over time in the persistence of the inflation gap measured
in terms of short- to medium-term predicability. We present evidence that our measure of the inflation-gap
persistence increased until Volcker brought mean inflation down in the early 1980s and that it then
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gap persistence emerges from the VAR than from the univariate model. We interpret these changes
in terms of a simple dynamic new Keynesian model that allows us to distinguish altered monetary
policy rules and altered private sector parameters.
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Abstract
We use Bayesian methods to estimate two models of post WWII U.S. in-
°ation rates with drifting stochastic volatility and drifting coe±cients. One
model is univariate, the other a multivariate autoregression. We de¯ne the
in°ation gap as the deviation of in°ation from a pure random walk component
of in°ation and use both models to study changes over time in the persistence
of the in°ation gap measured in terms of short- to medium-term predicability.
We present evidence that our measure of the in°ation-gap persistence increased
until Volcker brought mean in°ation down in the early 1980s and that it then
fell during the chairmanships of Volcker and Greenspan. Stronger evidence for
movements in in°ation gap persistence emerges from the VAR than from the
univariate model. We interpret these changes in terms of a simple dynamic
new Keynesian model that allows us to distinguish altered monetary policy
rules and altered private sector parameters.
1 Introduction
This paper studies how in°ation persistence has changed since the Great In°ation.
We distinguish the persistence of in°ation from the persistence of a component of it
called the in°ation gap. Our ¯rst message is that although in°ation remains highly
persistent, the in°ation gap became less persistent after the Volcker disin°ation. Our
second message is that multivariate information helps to detect changes in in°ation-
gap persistence. Although the univariate evidence is mixed, a clearer picture emerges
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1from a VAR. Our third message is that the decline in in°ation-gap persistence seems
to be due for the most part to lower variability of changes in the Fed's long-run
in°ation target.
We decompose in°ation into two parts, a stochastic trend ¿t that (to a ¯rst-order
approximation) evolves as a driftless random walk, and an in°ation gap gt = ¼t ¡ ¿t
that represents temporary di®erences between actual and trend in°ation. In general
equilibrium models, trend in°ation is usually pinned down by a central bank's target,
a view that associates movements in trend in°ation with shifts in the Federal Reserve's
target. Because trend in°ation is a driftless random walk, actual in°ation has a unit
autoregressive root and is highly persistent. In our view, target in°ation has not
stopped drifting, though its conditional variance has declined.1
Transient movements in the in°ation gap are layered on top of ¿t. (Cogley and
Sargent 2001 and 2005a) reported weak evidence of a decline in in°ation-gap persis-
tence. Several authors have challenged the statistical signi¯cance of that evidence
(e.g., see Sims 2001, Stock 2001, and Pivetta and Reis 2007). Here we report new
evidence that is more decisive. We can now say that it is very likely that in°ation-gap
persistence has decreased since the Great In°ation.
We organize the discussion as follows. We begin with an unobserved components
model of Stock and Watson (2007) and relate it to the drifting-parameter VARs of
Cogley and Sargent (2005a) and Primiceri (2005). We use these statistical models to
de¯ne trend in°ation and to focus attention on the in°ation gap.
Next we de¯ne a measure of persistence in terms of the predictability of the
in°ation gap,2 in particular, as the fraction of total in°ation-gap variation j quarters
ahead that is due to shocks inherited from the past. We say that the in°ation gap
is weakly persistent when the e®ects of shocks decay quickly and that it is strongly
persistent when they decay slowly. When the e®ects of past shocks die out quickly,
future shocks account for most of the variation in gt+j, pushing our measure close to
zero. But when the e®ects of past shocks on gt+j decay slowly, they account for a
higher proportion of near-term movements, pushing our measure of persistence closer
to one. Thus, a large fraction of variation over short to medium horizons that is
due to past shocks signi¯es strong persistence and a small fraction indicates weak
persistence.
Under a convenient approximation, our measure is the R2 statistic for j-step
ahead in°ation-gap forecasts.3 Heuristically, a connection between predictability and
1For evidence that the innovation variance for ¿t has declined, see Stock and Watson (2007).
2This measure is inspired by Diebold and Kilian (2001). Barsky (1987) used a closely-related
measure to compare in°ation persistence under the Gold Standard and after World War II.
3Strictly speaking, we should say `pseudo forecasts' because we neglect complications associated
with real-time forecasting. This is not a shortcut; it is intentional. Our goal is to make retrospective
statements about in°ation persistence. To attain as much precision as possible, we use ex post
revised data and estimate parameters using data through the end of the sample.
2persistence arises because past shocks give rise to forecastable movements in gt+j;
while future shocks contribute to the forecast error. Hence, the continuing in°uence
of past shocks can be measured by the proportion of predictable variation in gt+j:
We deduce persistence measures from the posterior distribution of a drifting-
parameter VAR, then study how they have changed since the Great In°ation. A key
¯nding is that in°ation gaps were highly predictable circa 1980, but are much less so
now. Furthermore, the evidence of declining persistence is statistically signi¯cant at
conventional levels. Thus, the statistical results strengthen our conviction that the
in°ation gap has become less persistent.
Finally, we use a simple dynamic new Keynesian model to examine what caused
the change in the law of motion for in°ation. In our DSGE model, improved monetary
policy is the single most important factor explaining the decline in in°ation volatility
and persistence. A key dimension is the reduction in the rate at which the Fed's target
drifts. Nevertheless, nonpolicy factors are also important; in particular, we ¯nd that
mark-up shocks have become less volatile and persistent, and this also contributes
to better in°ation outcomes. In our model, better policy and changes in the private
sector both play a role.
2 Unobserved components models for in°ation
Stock and Watson (2007) estimate a univariate unobserved components model for
in°ation. They assume that in°ation ¼t is the sum of a stochastic trend ¿t and a
martingale-di®erence innovation "¼t;
¼t = ¿t + "¼t: (1)
The trend component evolves as a driftless random walk,
¿t = ¿t¡1 + "¿t: (2)
Equation (1) is the measurement equation for a state-space representation, and equa-
tion (2) is the state equation. The innovations "¼t and "¿t are assumed to be martin-
gale di®erences that are conditionally normal with variances h¼t and h¿t; respectively.
The latter are independent stochastic volatilities that evolve as geometric random
walks,
lnh¼t = lnh¼t¡1 + ¾¼´¼t; (3)
lnh¿t = lnh¿t¡1 + ¾¿´¿t
where ´¼t and ´¿t are i.i.d. Gaussian shocks with means of zero that are mutually
independent.
3A consensus has emerged that trend in°ation is well approximated by a driftless
random walk. Authors who model trend in°ation in this way include Cogley and
Sargent (2001, 2005a), Ireland (2007), Smets and Wouters (2003), and Cogley and
Sbordone (2006). There is little controversy about this feature of the data. Our main
focus, however, is on the in°ation gap, gt ´ ¼t ¡¿t: We want to know how persistent
gt is and whether the degree of persistence in gt has changed over time. Stock and
Watson's (2007) model is not a suitable vehicle for investigating this issue because it
imposes that gt ´ ²¼t is serially uncorrelated for all t.
Reading the literature on in°ation persistence can be confusing because authors
sometimes fail to state clearly what feature of the data they are trying to measure.
For instance, Pivetta and Reis (2007) look for changes in in°ation persistence by
running rolling unit-root tests on ¼t. They ¯nd that the largest autoregressive root
is always close to 1 and conclude that in°ation persistence is unchanged. But that
¯nding can be viewed simply as a manifestation of shifts in target in°ation: ¼t has a
unit root because ¿t drifts. Estimates of the largest autoregressive root in ¼t would
help measure in°ation-gap persistence only if trend in°ation were constant over time,
an assumption that much of the recent literature denies.4
Stock and Watson's speci¯cation is a useful starting point because it highlights
the role of ¿t: But it is not a good vehicle for pursuing questions about in°ation-gap
persistence because it assumes that gt = "¼t is a martingale di®erence. To address the
questions about the persistence of gt that interest us, we must modify their model.
Cogley and Sargent (2005a) estimate a closely related time-varying parameter
VAR. Evidence reported there suggests that gt is autocorrelated and that the degree
of serial dependence has probably changed over time. But that model assumed no
stochastic volatility in the parameter innovations, a feature that Stock and Watson
say is important. In this paper, we combine and extend features of Stock and Watson's
model and our earlier ones to create a new model that lets us focus on the persistence
of the in°ation gap.
2.1 A univariate autoregression with drifting parameters
As a ¯rst step, we introduce an autoregressive term into Stock and Watson's
representation. With this addition, the measurement and state equations become
¼t = ¹t¡1 + ½t¡1¼t¡1 + "¼t; (4)
°t = °t¡1 + "st; (5)
where °t = [¹t;½t]0 and "st = ["¹t;"½t]0: Here the vector "st is the noise in a state vector,
whose components are parameter values in the measurement equation (4). Notice that
4Levin and Piger (2004) pointed out this shortcoming of Pivetta and Reis. After allowing for a
shift in trend in°ation, Levin and Piger were able to detect a decline in in°ation-gap persistence.
4the constant term in the measurement equation has become an intercept rather than
a local approximation to the mean.5 As in our earlier work, we approximate trend
in°ation by ¿t
: = ¹t=(1 ¡ ½t): To a ¯rst-order approximation, this is also a driftless
random walk.6
Equations (4) and (5) describe a univariate autoregression with drifting param-
eters. If the innovation variances were all constant, (4){(5) would be a special case
of the time-varying parameter model of Cogley and Sargent (2001). In Cogley and
Sargent (2005a) and Primiceri (2005), the measurement-innovation variance is time-
varying, but the variance of the state-innovation "st variance is constant. In contrast,
Stock and Watson assume that both innovation variances are time varying. Here
we follow Stock and Watson by modeling both innovation variances as stochastic
volatility processes.
We retain Stock and Watson's speci¯cation for var("¼t); and we adopt a bivariate
stochastic volatility model for the state innovations "st:
var("st) = Qt = B
¡1HstB
¡10: (6)













The diagonal elements of Hst are independent, univariate stochastic volatilities that
evolve as driftless, geometric random walks:
lnhit = lnhit¡1 + ¾i´it; (9)
i = ¼;s. The volatility innovations ´it are mutually independent, standard normal
variates. The variance of ¢lnhit depends on the free parameter ¾i: For tractability
and parsimony, we also assume that "st is uncorrelated at all leads and lags with "¼t
and that the standardized state and measurement innovations are independent of the
volatility innovations ´t:
This is a convenient speci¯cation for modeling recurrent persistent changes in
variance. It ensures that Qt is positive de¯nite and allows for time-varying correlations
among the elements of "st:
We constrain ½t to be less than one in absolute value at all dates. Having assumed
that trend in°ation is a driftless random walk, the stability constraint on ½t just rules
5We also adopt a slightly di®erent dating convention. The reason for this dating convention will
become clear when we discuss predictability. Nothing of substance hinges on this convention.
6A ¯rst-order Taylor approximation makes ¿t a linear function of °t; which evolves as a driftless
random walk.
5out a second unit or explosive root in in°ation. There is an emerging consensus that
the price level is best modeled as an I(2) process, but few economists think that it is
I(3). The stability constraint just rules out an I(3) representation.
The model is estimated by Bayesian methods using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo
algorithm outlined in appendix A.
2.2 A vector autoregression with drifting parameters
Although a univariate autoregression is a useful ¯rst step, it is not entirely satis-
factory for representing changes in the in°ation process. Cogley and Sargent (2001
and 2005a) found evidence of changes in the autocorrelations of the in°ation gap and
also in cross-correlations with lags of other variables. Accordingly, we also consider a
vector autoregression with drifting parameters. Since our de¯nition of the persistence
of gt is based on its predictability, it is interesting to check how ¯ndings depend on
the information that we use to condition predictions.
As in Cogley and Sargent (2005a), we estimate a trivariate VAR for in°ation,
unemployment, and a short-term nominal interest rate. The state and measurement
equations for the VAR are
yt = X
0
t¡1µt¡1 + "yt; (10)
µt = µt¡1 + "st: (11)
The vector yt contains current observations on the variables of interest, Xt¡1 includes
constants plus lags of yt, and "yt is a vector of innovations. The parameter vector µt
evolves as a driftless random walk subject to a re°ecting barrier that guarantees that
the VAR has nonexplosive roots at every date.
We assume that the innovation variances follow multivariate stochastic volatility
processes. The state innovation variance Qt has the same form as in the AR(1)
model, but has a higher dimension to conform to the size of µt: We assume that the
measurement innovation variance Vt also has this form, again adapting its dimensions
to the size of "yt:
This model is very much like those in Cogley and Sargent (2005a) and Primiceri
(2005). The main di®erence concerns the speci¯cation for var("st): Our earlier pa-
pers assumed that the parameter innovation variance was constant; here we adopt a
stochastic volatility model so that the variance is time varying. Equations (10) and
(11) can also be regarded as a multivariate extension of Stock and Watson (2007).
We think this model is a useful vehicle for connecting their paper to this one.
We estimate the multivariate model by a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo
algorithm. Details are given in appendix A.1.
In what follows, we make frequent use of the companion form of the VAR,
zt+1 = ¹t + Atzt + "zt+1: (12)
6The vector zt includes current and lagged values of yt; the vector ¹t contains the VAR
intercepts, and the companion matrix At contains the autoregressive parameters. We
use the companion form for multi-step forecasting. When we do that, we approximate
multi-step forecasts by assuming that VAR parameters will remain constant at their
current values going forward in time. This approximation is common in the literature
on bounded rationality and learning, being a key element of an `anticipated-utility'
model (Kreps 1998). In other papers, we have found that it does a good job of
approximating the mean of Bayesian predictive densities (e.g., see Cogley, Morozov,
and Sargent 2005 and Cogley and Sargent 2006).
With this assumption, we can form local-to-date t approximations to the moments
of zt: For the unconditional mean, we follow Beveridge and Nelson (1981) by de¯ning
the stochastic trend in zt as the value to which the series is expected to converge in
the long run:
¹ zt = lim
h!1
Etzt+h: (13)
With µt held constant at its current value, we approximate this as
¹ zt » = (I ¡ At)
¡1¹t: (14)
To a ¯rst-order approximation, ¹ zt evolves as a driftless random walk, implying that
in°ation and the other variables in yt have a unit root. As in the AR(1) model, the
stability constraint on At just rules out an I(2) representation for yt.
After subtracting ¹ zt from both sides of (12) and invoking the anticipated-utility
approximation, we get a forecasting model for gap variables,
(zt+1 ¡ ¹ zt) = At(zt ¡ ¹ zt) + "z;t+1: (15)
We approximate forecasts of gap variables j periods ahead as A
j
t^ zt;7 and we approx-
imate the forecast-error variance by








To approximate the unconditional variance of ^ zt+1; we take the limit of the conditional
variance as the forecast horizon j increases,8








Under the anticipated-utility approximation, this is also the unconditional variance
of ^ zt+s for s > 1:
7By the anticipated-utility approximation, Et¹ zt+j = ¹ zt: This is a good approximation because ¹ zt
is a driftless random walk to a ¯rst-order approximation.
8This is a second-moment analog to the Beveridge-Nelson trend.
73 Persistence and predictability
Let ¼t = e¼zt, where e¼ is a selector vector. To measure persistence at a given date
t, we calculate the fraction of the total variation in gt+j that is due to shocks inherited
from the past relative to those that will occur in the future. This is equivalent to 1
minus the fraction of the total variation due to future shocks. Since future shocks
account for the forecast error, that fraction can be expressed as the ratio of the
conditional variance to the unconditional variance,
R
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We label this R2
jt because it is analogous to the R2 statistic for j-step ahead forecasts.
This fraction must lie between zero and one, and it converges to zero as the forecast
horizon j lengthens.9 Whether it converges rapidly or slowly re°ects the degree of
persistence. If past shocks die out quickly, the fraction converges rapidly to zero. But
if one or more shocks decay slowly, the fraction may converge only gradually to zero,
possibly remaining close to one for some time. Thus, for small or medium j ¸ 1, a
small fraction signi¯es weak persistence and a large fraction strong persistence.
In a univariate AR(1) model, things simplify because R2
jt depends on a single pa-
rameter ½t: In this case, the unconditional variance is ¾2
"t=(1¡½2
t), and the conditional





jt simpli¯es to ½
2j
t :
Matters are more complicated if we increase the number of lags or add other
variables. For a VAR, the ratio depends on all of the parameters of the companion
matrix At: Sometimes economists summarize persistence in a VAR by focusing on
the largest autoregressive root in At: This is problematic for at least two reasons.
One is that the largest root could be associated not with in°ation but with another
variable in the VAR. Hence the largest root of At might exaggerate persistence in
the in°ation gap. Another problem is that two large roots could matter for in°ation,
in which case the largest root of At would understate the degree of persistence. We
think it is important to retain all the information in At:
3.1 A caveat
Nevertheless, (18) is not entirely satisfactory because it depends on the conditional
variance Vt+1 in addition to the conditional mean parameters At. Changes in Vt+1
that take the form of a scalar multiplication are not a problem because the scalar
would cancel in numerator and denominator. But R2
jt is not invariant to other changes
9This follows from the stability constraint on At:
8in Vt+1. For instance, our measure of persistence would be reduced by a change in the
composition of structural shocks away from those whose impulse response functions
decay slowly and toward those whose impulse response functions vanish quickly.
This problem really relates to the question of why in°ation persistence has changed,
not whether it has changed. For the moment, we want to focus on the latter. We
think that assembling evidence about the structure of in°ation persistence is a step
in the right direction.
In what follows, we focus on horizons of 1, 4, and 8 quarters, those being the
most relevant for monetary policy. We calculate values of R2
jt implied by a drifting-
parameter VAR and study how they have changed over time.
4 Properties of in°ation
In°ation is measured either as the log-di®erence of the GDP or PCE chain-type
price index. Stock and Watson (2007) examine GDP in°ation. A number of colleagues
in the Federal Reserve system encouraged us to look at PCE in°ation as well, saying
that the Fed pays more attention to that for policy purposes.
For the VAR, we also condition on unemployment and a short-term nominal inter-
est rate. Unemployment is measured by the civilian unemployment rate. The original
monthly series was converted to a quarterly basis by sampling the middle month of
each quarter. As in Cogley and Sargent (2001 and 2005a), the logit of the unemploy-
ment rate enters the VAR. The nominal interest rate is measured by the secondary
market rate on three-month Treasury bills. These data are also sampled monthly,
and we converted to a quarterly series by selecting the ¯rst month of each quarter in
order to align the nominal interest data as well as possible with the in°ation data.
For the VAR, the nominal interest rate is expressed as yield to maturity.
The in°ation and unemployment data are seasonally adjusted, and all the data
span the period 1948.Q1 to 2004.Q4. The data were downloaded from the Federal
Reserve Economic Database (FRED).10
Our priors are described in the appendices. For the most part, they follow our
earlier papers. Our guiding principle was to use proper priors to ensure that the
posterior is proper, but to make the priors as weakly informative as possible, so that
the posterior is dominated by information in the data.11
10This can be found at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. The series have FRED mnemonics
GDPCTPI, PCECTPI, UNRATE, and TB3MS, respectively
11We think this is appropriate for exploratory data analysis. However it means that we cannot
compare models via Bayes factors for reasons having to do with the Lindley paradox. E.g., see
Gelfand (1996).
94.1 Trend in°ation and in°ation volatility
A number of our ¯ndings resemble those reported elsewhere (e.g. Cogley and
Sargent 2005a, Stock and Watson 2007). We brie°y touch on them before moving on
to novel ones.
Figure 1 portrays the posterior median and interquartile range for ¿t: The left and
right-hand columns depict estimates for the AR(1) and VAR, respectively, while the
top and bottom rows correspond to GDP and PCE in°ation. Trend in°ation is esti-
mated using data through 2004.Q4. Accordingly, the ¯gure represents a retrospective
interpretation of the data.






















































Figure 1: Trend In°ation
The patterns shown here are similar to those reported in earlier papers. Trend
in°ation was low and steady in the early 1960s, it began rising in the mid-1960s, and
it attained twin peaks around the time of the 1970s oil shocks. It fell sharply during
the Volcker disin°ation, and then settled down to the neighborhood of 2 percent
after the mid-1990s. There are some di®erences between the AR(1) and the VAR,
and those di®erences will in°uence some properties of the in°ation gap. Nevertheless,
the broad contour of trend in°ation is similar across models.
The next two ¯gures summarize changes in in°ation volatility. Once again, we
plot the posterior median and interquartile range at each date. The top row in each
¯gure shows the standard deviation for the in°ation innovation, and the bottom row
plots the unconditional standard deviation, [e¼V^ zte0
¼]1=2:

























Figure 2: GDP In°ation Volatility



























Figure 3: PCE In°ation Volatility
The patterns shown here are also familiar from earlier papers. For the univariate
models, the innovation variance started rising in the mid 1960s and peaked around
the time of the ¯rst oil shock. After that, the innovation variance declined gradually
until the mid 1990s. The pattern for the V ARs is a bit di®erent. Instead of a gradual
rise and fall, the V AR innovation variance remains roughly constant for most of
11the sample, except for a spike in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Fed was
targeting monetary aggregates. That the innovation variances di®er across univariate
and multivariate models is not surprising because they portray di®erent conditional
variances. The VARs condition on more variables, and its innovation variance would
be the same as in the univariate model only if the additional variables failed to
Granger cause in°ation. Since the additional variables were chosen precisely because
they help forecast in°ation, the VAR innovation variances are lower than the AR(1)
innovation variances.
The bottom rows of ¯gures 2 and 3 illustrate the unconditional standard deviation
of in°ation. For the AR(1) models, the general contour is similar to that of the
innovation variance, but the magnitudes di®er. The unconditional variance also rises
and falls gradually, but it reaches a higher peak in the mid 1970s. For an AR(1), the
unconditional variance can be expressed as ¾2
¼t = ¾2
"t=(1 ¡ ½2
t): If ½t were constant,
movements in ¾¼t would mirror those in ¾"t: From the patterns shown here, it follows
that changes in the innovation variance account for much of the variation in the
unconditional variance, but not all of it. Changes in ½t also matter. We say more
about the contribution of ½t below.
Similar comments apply to the VARs, except that changes in the relative magni-
tudes of the two variances are even more pronounced. In the early 1980s, the standard
deviation of VAR innovations rose by about 10 basis points, an increase of roughly
20 percent. At the same time, the unconditional standard deviation increased by
roughly 4 percentage points, or about 200 percent. Hence for the VAR, changes in
the innovation variance account for a relatively small proportion of changes in the
unconditional variance. Most of the variation in the VAR unconditional variance
must be due to changes in persistence.
Among other things, this means that a multivariate conditioning set is likely to
be more helpful for detecting changes in in°ation persistence. A univariate model
may not use enough information.
4.2 Has the in°ation gap become less persistent?
To focus more clearly on changes in persistence parameters, we turn to evidence
on the predictability of the in°ation gap. First we consider univariate evidence and
then we turn to results from the VAR.
4.2.1 Univariate evidence
For the AR(1) model, everything depends on a single parameter ½t: Figure 4


















Figure 4: Posterior Median and Interquartile Range for ½t
For GDP in°ation, the in°ation gap is moderately persistent throughout the sam-
ple. The median estimate for ½t was around 0.55 in the early 1960s. It increased
gradually to 0.7 by 1980, and then fell in two steps in the early 1980s and early
1990s, eventually reaching a value of 0.3 at the end of the sample. These estimates
imply half-lives of 3.5, 5.8, and 1.7 months, respectively. For PCE in°ation, the gap
was initially less persistent, with an autocorrelation of 0.3, but otherwise movements
in ½t are similar to those for GDP in°ation. The patterns shown here are consistent
with evidence reported in our earlier papers. Taken at face value, the ¯gure suggests
not only that in°ation was lower on average during the Volcker-Greenspan years, but
also that the in°ation gap was less persistent.
The controversy about in°ation persistence hinges not on the evolution of the
posterior median or mean, however, but rather on whether changes in ½t are statis-
tically signi¯cant. To assess this, we examine the joint posterior distribution for ½t
across pairs of time periods. There are many possible pairs, of course, and to make
the problem manageable we concentrate on two pairs, 1960-1980 and 1980-2004. The
years 1960 and 2004 are the beginning and end of our sample, respectively.12 We
chose 1980.Q4 because it was the eve of the Volcker disin°ation and because it splits
the sample roughly in half. However, the results reported below are not particularly
sensitive to this choice. Dates adjacent to 1980.Q4 tell much the same story.
Figures 5 and 6 depict results for GDP in°ation. Figure 5 portrays the joint dis-
tribution for ½1980 and ½2004; with values for 1980 plotted on the x-axis and those for
2004 on the y-axis. Combinations clustered near the 45 degree line represent pairs
for which there was little or no change. Those below the 45 degree line represent a
decrease in persistence (½1980 > ½2004), while those above represent increasing per-
sistence. Similarly, ¯gure 6 illustrates the joint distribution for ½1960 and ½1980; with
values for 1960 plotted on the x-axis and those for 1980 on the y-axis.
12Earlier data are used as a training sample for the prior.














Figure 5: Joint Distribution for ½1980 and ½2004; GDP In°ation









































r½1960 and ½1980; GDP In°ation
A number of alternative perspectives can be represented on these graphs. Stock
and Watson assume ½t = 0, so the point (0;0) represents their model. There are
some realizations in the neighborhood of the origin, but most of the probability mass
lies elsewhere. The second column of table 1 reports the probability that ½t is close
to zero in both periods, where `close' is de¯ned as j½j < 0:1: This comes out to 1.2
and 1.7 percent, respectively, for the two pairs of years. This ¯nding motivates our
extension of their model.
14Table 1: Posterior Probabilities
GDP In°ation
pair Stock-Watson j¢½j < 0:05 High, No Change Changing ½
1980, 2004 0.012 0.122 <0.001 0.894
1960, 1980 0.017 0.384 0.027 0.758
PCE In°ation
pair Stock-Watson j¢½j < 0:05 High, No Change Changing ½
1980, 2004 0.006 0.056 <0.001 0.959
1960, 1980 0.008 0.066 <0.001 0.956
Sims (2001), Stock (2001), and Pivetta and Reis (2007) argue that in°ation persis-
tence is approximately unchanged. That perspective can be represented by drawing
a neighborhood along the 45 degree line. As ¯gures 5 and 6 show, the posterior at-
taches considerable probability mass to a ridge clustered tightly along the 45 degree
line. How much probability is near that ridge depends on how a neighborhood is
de¯ned. For example, if we de¯ne `little change' by the neighborhood j¢½j < 0:05;
the posterior probability comes to 12 and 38 percent, respectively, for the two pairs of
years. Obviously these probabilities would be higher if we widened the neighborhood
and lower if we narrowed it, but the point is that the probability is nontrivial even
for a narrowly de¯ned interval along the 45 degree line. For the GDP de°ator, the
notion that univariate in°ation-gap persistence is approximately constant cannot be
rejected at the 10 percent level.
If we examine the ridges more closely, we notice that the scatterplots are densest
along the ridge for low values of ½ and that they become sparse for high values.
Thus, the notion that in°ation-gap persistence is both unchanging and high has little
support. For example, if we de¯ne `high persistence' as a half-life of 1 year or more
(½ ¸ 0:8409), the probability of high and unchanging persistence is less than one-tenth
of 1 percent for 1980-2004 and 2.7 percent for 1960-1980. In°ation-gap persistence
might have been high (especially during the Great In°ation), or it might have been
unchanged, but it is unlikely that it was both. As noted above, the notion that
persistence is both high and unchanging really applies to in°ation { because of drift
in ¿t { but not to the in°ation gap.
In ¯gure 5, the largest probability mass of points { a bit less than 90 percent
{ lies below the 45 degree line. For combinations in this region, ½1980 > ½2004; so
this represents the probability of declining in°ation-gap persistence. We interpret
this as substantial though not decisive evidence of a decline in persistence. Similarly,
in ¯gure 6, the preponderance of the combinations { approximately 75 percent {
lie above the 45 degree line and are consistent with the idea that the in°ation gap
became more persistent between 1960 and 1980.
15Thus, for GDP in°ation the univariate evidence is mixed. While the preponder-
ance of the joint distribution points to a rise and then a decline in persistence, there
is enough mass along the 45 degree ridge in ¯gures 5 and 6 to support the idea that
in°ation-gap persistence has not changed. This does not mean that the two inter-
pretations stand on an equal footing; one has higher posterior probability than the
other. But neither perspective overwhelms the other, and neither can be dismissed
as unreasonable.
Figures 7 and 8 repeat this analysis for PCE in°ation. For this measure, clear
evidence emerges of a rise in persistence between 1960 and 1980 and a decline there-
after. In ¯gures 7 and 8, the 45 degree ridges are more sparsely populated than those
for GDP in°ation, and the great majority of points lie below or above the line. The
probability of an increase in ½t between 1960 and 1980 is 0.956, and the probability
of a decline after 1980 is 0.959. This is signi¯cant evidence of changing in°ation-gap
persistence.









































r½1980 and ½2004; PCE In°ation






































r½1960 and ½1980; PCE In°ation
164.2.2 A pitfall: uncertainty at one time or across time?
Had we followed the methods of Pivetta and Reis (2007), we would not have de-
tected these changes. Pivetta and Reis assess statistical signi¯cance by asking whether
a horizontal line can be drawn through marginal con¯dence bands surrounding the
mean or median. If it can, they conclude that the evidence for change is statisti-
cally insigni¯cant. For both GDP and PCE in°ation, marginal con¯dence bands for
½t overlap at all three dates. Hence we would have mistakenly concluded that the
evidence for changing persistence is insigni¯cant. Their procedure is di±cult to in-
terpret, however, because it confounds uncertainty about the level of ½t at a point in
time with uncertainty about changes in ½t across dates. A marginal con¯dence band
is ¯ne for assessing level uncertainty at a point in time, but we must consult the joint
distribution across dates in order to assess uncertainty about changes.13 For PCE
in°ation, the joint distribution points to signi¯cant changes in ½t:
4.3 Multivariate evidence
As noted above, the estimates reported in ¯gures 2 and 3 suggest that VARs are
more promising for detecting changes in in°ation-gap persistence. Accordingly, we
now turn to multivariate evidence. For each draw in the posterior distribution for
VAR parameters, we calculate R2
jt statistics as in equation (18) and then study how
they changed during and after the Great In°ation. Figure 9 portrays the posterior
median and interquartile range for R2
jt for j = 1;4; and 8 quarters.
The top row refers to 1-quarter ahead forecasts. In the mid 1960s, VAR pseudo
forecasts accounted for approximately 50 to 55 percent of the variation of the in°ation
gap. During the Great In°ation, this increased to more than 90 percent and at times
approached 99 percent. The in°ation gap became less predictable during the Volcker
disin°ation, and after that R2
1t settled to the neighborhood of 50 percent. It was still
around 50 percent at the end of the sample.
The second and third rows refer to 4 and 8 quarter forecasting horizons. As
expected, R2
jt statistics are lower for longer horizons. For j = 4; VAR pseudo forecasts
accounted for roughly a quarter of the in°ation-gap variation in the mid 1960s, for
approximately 50 to 75 percent during the Great In°ation, and for about 15 percent
after the Volcker disin°ation. For j = 8; the numbers follow a similar pattern but are
lower. VAR pseudo forecasts accounted for about 10 percent of in°ation-gap variation
in the mid-1960s, for 20 to 35 percent during the mid 1970s and early 1980s, and for 10
percent or less after the Volcker disin°ation. Thus, there was apparently a substantial
decline in in°ation-gap predictability after the mid 1980s.
13Sims and Zha (1999) make this point in the context of con¯dence bands for impulse response
functions. Their logic applies here.




























Yet the question remains whether the changes are statistically signi¯cant. We
approach this question in the same way as before, by examining the joint posterior
distribution for R2
jt across pairs of years. Figures 10 and 11 plot the joint distribution
for R2
1t for the years 1980 and 2004. Values for 1980 are shown on the x-axis, and
those for 2004 are on the y-axis. For both measures of in°ation, virtually the entire
distribution lies below the 45 degree line, signifying that R2
1;1980 > R2
1;2004 with high
probability. Very few points are clustered along the 45 degree line.


















Figure 10: Joint Distribution for R2
1;1980 and R2
1;2004; GDP In°ation


















Figure 11: Joint Distribution forR2
1;1980 and R2
1;2004; PCE In°ation
Table 2 records the fraction of posterior draws for which R2
jt declined between
1980 and 2004. For 1-step ahead pseudo forecasts, the probability of a decline is
98.9 and 97.8 percent, respectively, for GDP and PCE in°ation, thus con¯rming the
visual impression conveyed by the ¯gures. For 4- and 8-quarter ahead forecasts, the
joint distributions are less tightly concentrated than those shown above, and the
probabilities are a bit lower. Nevertheless, at the 4-quarter horizon, the probability
of a decline in R2
jt is almost 96 percent for GDP in°ation and 92 percent for PCE
in°ation, and they are a bit less than 90 percent at the 8-quarter horizon.
19Table 2: Probability of Changing R2
jt
GDP In°ation
pair 1 Quarter Ahead 4 Quarters Ahead 8 Quarters Ahead
1980, 2004 0.989 0.957 0.889
1960, 1980 0.991 0.919 0.820
PCE In°ation
pair 1 Quarter Ahead 4 Quarters Ahead 8 Quarters Ahead
1980, 2004 0.978 0.922 0.876
1960, 1980 0.960 0.857 0.792
Figures 12 and 13 examine changes in predictability between 1960 and 1980.
Here we plot R2
1;1960 on the x-axis and R2
1;1980 on the y-axis. Now virtually the entire
distribution lies above the 45 degree line, signifying that R2
1;1960 < R2
1;1980 with high
probability. Table 2 also reports the probability of an increase in R2
j;t between 1960
and 1980. For GDP in°ation, this probability is 99.1 percent for 1-quarter ahead
pseudo forecasts, 91.9 percent for 1-year ahead forecasts, and 82 percent for 2-year
ahead forecasts. The probabilities are slightly lower for PCE in°ation, but the results
still point to a signi¯cant change in predictability at the 1-quarter horizon.
Thus, statistically signi¯cant evidence for changes in in°ation persistence emerges
from VARs. Estimates of R2
1t put posterior probabilities above 96 percent on the joint
event of both an increase in persistence during the Great In°ation and a decline in
persistence after the Volcker disin°ation. The results for 4-quarter ahead forecasts
also point in this direction, standing at the 90 or 95 percent levels for a fall in
persistence in the second half of the sample and straddling the 90 percent level for
a rise in the ¯rst half. The results for 2-year ahead forecasts hint at a change in
persistence, but fall short of statistical signi¯cance at the 90 percent level.


















Figure 12: Joint Distribution forR2
1;1960 and R2
1;1980; GDP In°ation






















Barksy (1987) explains an apparent violation of the Fisher equation in prewar US
data in terms of changes in in°ation predictability. The correlation between in°a-
tion and short-term nominal interest was negative prior to World War II but positive
afterward. Barsky argues that this re°ects changes in the time-series properties of
in°ation, not a change in the structural relation between nominal interest and ex-
pected in°ation. Although in°ation was highly forecastable after the mid 1960s,
he documented that it was essentially unforecastable prior to World War I, and he
demonstrated that this could account for the absence of a Fisher correlation in pre-war
data.
Benati (2006) gathers data on in°ation in a wide variety of monetary regimes
and examines how in°ation persistence varies across regime. Broadly speaking, he
reports that high persistence occurs only in monetary regimes that lack a well-de¯ned
nominal anchor. For instance, for the modern era he contrasts countries whose central
bank explicitly targets in°ation with those that do not, and he ¯nds that in°ation
is more autocorrelated in the latter. He also extends Barsky's work by looking at
pre-WWII data from countries other than the US and con¯rms that in°ation was
close to white noise in many countries.
For the postwar US, Stock and Watson (2007) also document changes in the
predictability of in°ation. They ¯nd that in°ation has become both easier and harder
to forecast in the Volcker-Greenspan era. In an absolute sense, forecasting in°ation is
easier because in°ation is less volatile and its innovation variance is smaller. But in a
relative sense, predicting in°ation has become more di±cult because future in°ation
is less closely correlated with current in°ation and other predictors. Their conclusion
21agrees with ours: although the innovation variance for in°ation has declined, the
unconditional variance has fallen by more, implying that predictive R2 statistics are
lower.
5.1 Comparison with Atkeson-Ohanian ¯ndings
Stock and Watson also interpret a result of Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) in terms
of the changing time-series properties of in°ation. Atkeson and Ohanian studied
the predictive power of backward-looking Phillips-curve models during the Volcker-
Greenspan era and found that Phillips-curve forecasts were inferior to a naive forecast
that equates expected in°ation over the next 12 months with the simple average of
in°ation over the previous year. Stock and Watson show that Phillips-curve models
were more helpful during the Great In°ation, and they account for the change by
pointing to two features of the data. First, like many macroeconomic variables,
unemployment has become less volatile since the mid-1980s. Hence there is less
variation in the predictor. Second, the coe±cients linking unemployment and other
activity variables to future in°ation have also declined in absolute value, further
muting their predictive power.
Our VARs share these characteristics. In ¯gure 14 , we illustrate how news about
unemployment alters forecasts of in°ation. At each date, we imagine that forecasters
start with information on in°ation, unemployment, and the nominal interest rate
through date t ¡ 1 and then see a one-sigma innovation in unemployment. They
revise their in°ation forecasts in light of the unemployment news. Because the VAR




Since the innovations are conditionally normal and the unemployment innovation is
scaled to equal ¾ut; E("ztj"ut) = cov("zt;"ut)=¾ut: The ¯gure portrays the median and
interquartile range for forecast revisions at horizons of 1, 4, and 8 quarters.
For the most part, a positive innovation in unemployment reduces expected in°a-
tion. Furthermore, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the magnitude of forecast revisions
was substantial. For instance, according to the median estimates, a one-sigma inno-
vation in unemployment would have reduced expected in°ation 4 quarters ahead by
close to 50 basis points in the mid-1970s and by approximately 1 to 1.5 percentage
points at the time of the Volcker disin°ation. After the mid 1980s, however, the
sensitivity of in°ation forecasts to unemployment news was more muted. During the
Greenspan era, a one-sigma innovation in unemployment would have had essentially
no in°uence at all on in°ation forecasts one or two years ahead.
14This follows from another anticipated-utility approximation.





























































Figure 14: How Unemployment News Alters Expected In°ation
As Stock and Watson point out, these outcomes re°ect both that unemployment
innovations are less volatile and that in°ation forecasts are less sensitive to innova-
tions of a given size. Figure 15 depicts the posterior median and interquartile range
for ¾ut; the standard deviation of innovations to unemployment. The magnitude of
unemployment innovations was largest at the beginning of the sample and around
the time of the Volcker disin°ation, but it declined sharply after the mid 1980s. One
reason why unemployment news has become less relevant for in°ation forecasting is
that there is less of it.
But this is not the whole story. Figure 16 adjusts for changes in the innovation
variance by showing forecast revisions for the time-series average of the median esti-
mate of ¾ut shown in ¯gure 15. This holds the size of the hypothetical unemployment
innovation constant across dates. Although less pronounced, the pattern shown here
is similar to that depicted in ¯gure 14 (the two ¯gures are graphed on the same scale).
Hence ¯gure 14 cannot be explained solely by changes in ¾ut: Especially at horizons
23of a 4 or 8 quarters, in°ation forecasts have also become less sensitive to a given



















Figure 15: Standard Deviation of Unemployment Innovations





























































Figure 16: Forecast Revisions with ¾u Held Constant
24Ironically, the decreased predictive power of unemployment innovations for in°a-
tion coincided with a return of the Phillips correlation. Figure 17 portrays a number
of conditional and unconditional correlations for in°ation and unemployment.15 The
unconditional correlation { shown in the bottom row { was negative prior to the 1970s,
but it turned positive during the Great In°ation. A negative correlation reappeared
after the Volcker disin°ation and has hovered around -0.25 ever since.











































































Figure 17: Conditional and Unconditional Phillips Correlations
The other rows of the ¯gure depict conditional correlations at forecast horizons
of 1, 4, and 8 quarters. The 1- and 4-quarter ahead forecasts are most relevant for
15These were calculated using the approximations in equations (16) and (17).
25reconciling conventional wisdom with Atkeson and Ohanian. At these horizons, con-
ditional correlations have indeed been negative throughout the sample, peaking in
magnitude at the time of the Volcker disin°ation. They are smaller now than in the
past, but at the 4-quarter horizon the correlation is still around -0.25. Nevertheless,
these conditional correlations are irrelevant for prediction because they summarize
unexpected comovements in the two variables. That prediction errors in unemploy-
ment are inversely related with prediction errors in in°ation tells us little about fore-
castable movements in the two variables. Thus, Atkeson and Ohanian's observations
about predictability can coexist comfortably with conventional views about Phillips
correlations.
Contrary to Atekson and Ohanion, ¯gures 9-11 suggest that some short-term
predictability remains at the end of the sample. Two caveats should be kept in mind,
however. One is that our calculations involve pseudo forecasts that depend on data
and estimates through the end of the sample, while Atkeson and Ohanian look at
real-time, out-of-sample forecasts. Presumably this matters only slightly at the end
of the sample, but more for earlier periods.
The other caveat is that there is substantial uncertainty about R2
2004. We can
state with con¯dence that R2
2004 is smaller than R2
1980, but that is mainly because the
posterior for R2
1980 clusters tightly near 1. It is harder to say how predictable in°ation
is at the end of the sample. At the 1-quarter horizon, the probability that R2
2004
exceeds 0.25 is 0.904 for GDP in°ation and 0.924 for PCE in°ation. Thus, although
our estimates suggest more predictability than those of Atkeson and Ohanian, the fact
that the posteriors portrayed in ¯gures 10 and 11 assign non-negligible probability to
values of R2
2004 near zero provides at least some weak support for their point of view.
6 A More Structural Analysis
In this section we o®er a structural explanation of the statistical ¯ndings pre-
sented above. We estimate a New-Keynesian model along the lines of Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006). This model is a simple possible
framework for addressing the causes of the declines in the volatility, persistence, and
predictability of in°ation.
6.1 The model
The model economy is populated by a representative household, a continuum of

















26subject to a sequence of budget constraint
Z 1
0
Pt (i)Ct (i)di + Bt + Tt · Rt¡1Bt¡1 + ¦t +
Z 1
0
Wt (i)Lt (i)di. (21)
Bt represents government bonds, Tt denotes lump-sum taxes and transfers, Rt is the
gross nominal interest rate, and ¦t are the pro¯ts that ¯rms pay to the household.









Pt is the associated price index, Lt (i) denotes labor of type i that is used to produce
di®erentiated good i, and Wt (i) is the corresponding nominal wage. The coe±cients
h and º set the degree of internal habit formation and the inverse Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, respectively. Finally, bt and µt are exogenous shocks that follow the
stochastic processes
logbt = ½b logbt¡1 + "b;t (23)
logµt = (1 ¡ ½µ)logµ + ½µ logµt¡1 + "µ;t.
The random variable bt is an inter-temporal preference shock perturbing the discount
factor, and µt can be interpreted as a shock to the ¯rms' desired mark-up.
Each di®erentiated consumption good is produced by a monopolistically compet-
itive ¯rm using a linear production function,
Yt(i) = AtLt(i), (24)
where Yt (i) denotes the production of good i, and At represents aggregate labor
productivity. We model At as a unit root process with a growth rate zt ´ log(At=At¡1)
that follows the exogenous process
zt = (1 ¡ ½z)° + ½zzt¡1 + "z;t. (25)
As in Calvo (1983), at each point in time a fraction » of ¯rms cannot re-optimize
their prices and simply indexes them to the steady-state value of in°ation. Subject to
the usual cost-minimization condition, a re-optimizing ¯rm chooses its price ( ~ Pt(i))









sYt+s(i) ¡ Wt+s (i)Lt+s(i)
o
, (26)
where ¼ is the gross rate of in°ation in steady state and ¸t+s is the marginal utility
of consumption.























The central bank smooths interest rates and responds to two gaps, the deviation of
annual in°ation (¹ ¼4;t) from a time-varying in°ation target and the di®erence between
output and its °exible price level. R is the steady-state value for the gross nominal
interest rate and "R;t is a monetary policy shock that we assume to be i:i:d:
Following Ireland (2007), we model the in°ation target ¼¤




t = (1 ¡ ½¤)log¼ + ½¤ log¼
¤
t + "¤;t. (28)
There are many reasons that the Central Bank's in°ation target might vary over
time. Our preferred one is that the central bank endogenously adjusts its target as it
learns about the structure of the economy. For instance, Sargent (1999), Cogley and
Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2006), and Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006) hypothesize
that changing beliefs about the output-in°ation tradeo® generated a pronounced
low-frequency, hump-shaped pattern in in°ation. We approximate outcomes of this
learning process by an exogenous random variable like (28).16
6.2 Model solution and observation equation
Since the technology process At is assumed to have a unit root, consumption, real
wages, and output evolve along a stochastic growth path. To solve the model, we ¯rst
rewrite it in terms of deviations of these variables from the technology process. Then
we solve the log-linear approximation of the model around the non-stochastic steady
state. We specify the vector of observable variables as [log Yt ¡ logYt¡1;¼t;Rt]. For
estimation, we use data on per-capita GDP growth, the quarterly growth rate of the
GDP de°ator, and the Federal funds rate.17
6.3 Bayesian inference and priors
We use Bayesian methods to characterize the posterior distribution of the model's
structural parameters.18 Table 3 reports our priors. These priors are relatively dis-
perse and are broadly in line with those adopted in previous studies (see, for instance,
Del Negro et al. 2007 or Justiniano and Primiceri 2007). But a few items deserve
discussion.
16By way of analogy, technology is also endogenous, but macroeconomists often model it as an
exogenous random variable.
17These variables are standard for estimating small-scale DSGE models (see, for instance, Boivin
and Giannoni 2006).
18See appendix B.




































Inverse Gamma 0:15 1
Inverse Gamma 1 1
Inverse Gamma 0:15 1
Uniform 0:075 0:0433
Inverse Gamma 1 1
² We ¯x two parameters because they are not identi¯ed. In particular, we set the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply (1=º) to 0:5 and the steady-state price mark-up
(µ ¡ 1) to 10%.
² For all but two persistence parameters, we use a Beta prior with mean 0:6
and standard deviation 0:2. One exception concerns labor productivity, which
already includes a unit root. For this reason, we center the prior for the autocor-
relation of its growth rate (½z) at 0:4. The other exception is the autocorrelation
of the in°ation target shock, which we calibrate to 0:995. In other words, we
restrict ¼¤
t so that it captures low-frequency movements in in°ation.19
² The standard deviation of the innovation to the in°ation target is a crucial
parameter in our analysis because it governs the rate at which ¼¤
t drifts. We
want a weakly informative prior in order to let the data dominate the posterior.
Accordingly, we adopt a uniform prior on (0,0.15). For the standard deviations
of the other shocks, we follow Del Negro et al. (2007) by choosing priors that
19We do not set ½¤ = 1 because the DSGE model would not admit a non-stochastic steady state
and the log-linearization would not be possible in that case.
29are fairly disperse and that generate realistic volatilities for the endogenous
variables.
² Finally, we truncate the prior at the boundary of the determinacy region.
6.4 Estimation Results
We estimate the model separately on two subsamples. The ¯rst, 1960:I - 1979:II,
corresponds approximately to the period of rising in°ation before the Volcker chair-
manship. The second period, 1982:IV - 2006:IV, corresponds to the Volcker and
Greenspan chairmanships, excluding the years of monetary targeting, for which the
Taylor rule might not represent an appropriate description of systematic monetary
policy (see, for instance, Sims and Zha 2006 or Hanson 2006).
Figure 18 presents the model-implied evolution of the Central Bank in°ation ob-
jective. Notice that it resembles quite closely the VAR-based estimate of the perma-
nent component of in°ation plotted in ¯gure 1.











Figure 18: The Central Bank's In°ation Target
Table 4 reports estimates of the structural parameters. While many coe±cients
are similar across subsamples, there are some important di®erences. For example,
we ¯nd that the Taylor-rule coe±cient for in°ation ( Á¼) increased from 1:55 in the
¯rst subsample to 1:78 in the second. While an increase is consistent with ¯ndings of
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), we do not ¯nd
values of Á¼ in the pre-1980 period as low as they do. This might be due to the fact
that, for simplicity, we have ruled out indeterminacy a priori. Another possibility is
that the presence of a time varying in°ation target reduces the di®erences between
the reaction to in°ation in the two subsamples.




















































A second notable change in monetary policy concerns the innovation variances for
the two shocks, "¤;t and "R;t. According to our estimates, both declined substantially
after the Volcker disin°ation. The innovation variance for the shock to target in°ation
fell by almost 50 percent, from 0.081 to 0.049, while the variance for the funds-
rate shock declined even more, from 0.16 to 0.07. The decline in ¾¤ should not be
surprising, given the ¯ndings of Stock and Watson (2007) and our VAR statistical
results. It contributes directly to the decline in in°ation volatility after 1980.
Among the nonpolicy parameters, most change only slightly across the two sam-
ples. This is comforting because these parameters are supposed to be invariant to
changes in monetary policy. One exception is the persistence parameter ½µ for the
cost-push shock, which declines from 0.6 to 0.25. Thus, the cost-push shock is less
persistent and has smaller unconditional variance after 1982. This decline might re-
°ect the reduced incidence of oil-price shocks in the second half of the period. If that
is correct, the estimates capture elements of good luck as well as improved policy.
Table 5 summarizes the model's implications for in°ation volatility, persistence,
and predictability at the posterior median of the model parameters. Column 1 re-
ports the unconditional standard deviation of in°ation, while columns 2¡4 report R2
statistics for in°ation-gap predictability for forecasting horizons of 1, 4 and 8 quar-
ters.20 Notice that, in line with our statistical VAR ¯ndings, the model reproduces
20The in°ation gap here is de¯ned as the di®erence between in°ation and the central bank in°ation
31well the substantial decline in volatility, persistence and predictability of in°ation.
All decrease by roughly 50 to 70 percent.21
Table 5: Implications of the DSGE Model for In°ation Volatility and
Predictability




1960:I - 1979:II 4:702 0:631 0:433 0:409 0:132
1982:IV - 2006:IV 2:354 0:206 0:136 0:124 0:040
Percent Change ¡50 ¡67 ¡69 ¡70 ¡70
Finally, column 5 addresses the results of Atkeson and Ohanian (2001). Here we
report the model-implied slope ¯ of the Phillips curve,
Et
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We do not include a constant because the variables of the regression all have mean
zero in the model. Except for the fact that we replace the unemployment rate with
the output gap, this is the regression estimated by Atkeson and Ohanian (2001).
Consistent with their results, those of Stock and Watson, and our own results reported
above, our model implies a substantial decline in the predictive power of real-activity
variables in conventional Phillips curve regressions after the Volcker disin°ation.
6.5 Counterfactuals
In line with the statistical VAR ¯ndings, the DSGE model reproduces much of
the substantial decline in volatility, persistence, and predictability of in°ation. We
are su±ciently encouraged by its performance to use the DSGE model to explore the
structural sources of these changes.
In this subsection, we conduct some counterfactual exercises in order to under-
stand the causes of the decline in in°ation volatility, persistence, and predictability.
In the ¯rst experiment, we combine the Taylor-rule coe±cients ([Á¼;Áy;½R;¾R;¾¤])
of the second subsample with the private-sector parameters of the ¯rst. In this way,
we assess the extent to which better monetary policy would have reduced in°ation
volatility and persistence during the Great In°ation. In the second experiment, we
combine the private-sector parameters of the second subsample with the policy pa-
rameters of the ¯rst. This scenario illustrates the contribution of nonpolicy factors
to the improvement in in°ation outcomes.
objective that, in the DSGE model, captures the permanent component of in°ation.
21Since we estimate the model on two separate subsamples, the joint posterior distribution of the
coe±cients of the ¯rst and second subsample is not available. Therefore, we cannot report standard
errors.
32Table 6 reports the results. The numbers recorded there represent the proportion






Positive numbers signify that the counterfactual goes in the same direction as the
total change, and negative numbers mean that it goes in the opposite direction.








Policy 2, Private 1 75 43 90 91 -94
¾¤ 69 32 68 69 -46
Á¼ 9 13 28 28 -27
Private 2, Policy 1 36 43 15 14 125
½µ 7 -39 -109 -111 121
Monetary policy seems to be the most important factor behind the decline in
in°ation volatility. The change in policy rule accounts for 75 percent of the decline in
in°ation volatility. In contrast, better luck { primarily in the form of a less volatile
and persistent cost-push shock { accounts for 36 percent of the decline. This is a
substantial contribution, but only about half the magnitude of the e®ect of monetary
policy.22
The results for predictability are similar, especially at the 4 and 8 quarter horizons.
At those horizons, better monetary policy accounts for approximately 90 percent of
the decline, while changes in private-sector behavior account for around 15 percent.
At the 1-quarter horizon, however, the two factors contribute equally to the decline
in predictability, each accounting for 43 percent of the total change.
The second and third rows of the table 6 look more closely at particular aspects
of monetary policy. Here we change a single Taylor-rule parameter, holding all other
coe±cients equal to the estimated value from subsample 1. Otherwise the experiments
are the same as before.
Among monetary-policy coe±cients, changes in the variability of the in°ation
objective (¾¤) and in the reaction to in°ation (Á¼) have the largest impact on in°ation
outcomes. The more stable in°ation objective is responsible for the largest portion of
the decline in in°ation volatility and persistence, accounting for roughly two-thirds
22The two numbers need not sum to 100 because the model is nonlinear in the coe±cients and,
therefore, the total change is not the sum of the e®ects of the policy and nonpolicy coe±cients shift.
33of the total change. This is because changes in the Central Bank's in°ation target
generate persistent deviations of the nominal interest rate and marginal cost from the
steady state. In turn, this induces persistent deviations of in°ation from the target,
i.e., a persistent component in the in°ation-gap. Hence, a decline in the volatility of
the in°ation target reduces the overall persistence of the in°ation-gap by reducing
the relative importance of the persistent component.
Another important contributor is stronger monetary-policy reaction to in°ation.
In our model, however, this is secondary to enhanced stability of the in°ation target,
accounting for about 10 percent of the decline in volatility and 13-28 percent of the
decline in predictability. One reason that we might be ¯nding a smaller contribution
than has been found by others (e.g., Benati and Surico 2007) is that we truncate our
prior on the boundary of the determinacy region. Thus, our feedback parameter rises
from 1.56 to 1.78. Enhanced feedback plays a role in our model, but not the primary
role.
We also look more closely at the particular aspects of private-sector behavior
that have the greatest in°uence on changing in°ation outcomes. Among nonpolicy
parameters, the key change is the shift in the persistence of the mark-up shock. The
¯nal row of table 6 sheds light on its contribution. Everything else equal, the decline
in persistence of the mark-up shock (½µ) would have induced an increase in in°ation-
gap persistence. This might seem surprising but has a simple explanation: a reduction
in ½µ corresponds to a decrease in the unconditional variability of the mark-up shock,
which reduces the volatility of in°ation due to this shock. As a consequence, the role
of the in°ation-target shock for in°ation becomes relatively larger, and this increases
persistence.
The ¯nal column of table 6 examines how changes in monetary policy and private-
sector parameters contribute to the °attening of the slope in an Atkeson-Ohanian
regression. Recall that the DSGE model predicts a decline in ¯ from 0.13 to 0.04
across the two subsamples. In this case, the relative importance of better policy
and better luck are reversed. Changes in private sector parameters go in the right
direction and overpredict the total decline. Conditional on the mark-up shock, the
output gap and future changes in the in°ation rate comove positively. The drop in
persistence and unconditional volatility of the mark-up shock reduces this positive
comovement and results in a lower estimate of the slope coe±cient. But changes in
policy parameters go in the wrong direction and predict a substantial increase in ¯.
Thus, for a complete picture of the change in in°ation outcomes, both private and
policy factors are needed.
347 Concluding remarks
This paper reports what autoregressions with drifting coe±cients and stochastic
volatility say about the persistence of the in°ation gap de¯ned as the fraction of vari-
ation of future in°ation gaps that is due to past shocks. A high proportion means
that past shocks retain in°uence for a long time, while a low proportion signi¯es that
their in°uence decays quickly. Since past shocks give rise to forecastable variation
in future in°ation gaps, our concept of persistence is closely related to predictability.
VAR estimates point to a statistically signi¯cant increase in in°ation-gap predictabil-
ity during the Great In°ation and to a statistically signi¯cant decline in predictability
after the Volcker disin°ation. Univariate estimates are mixed, with signi¯cant evi-
dence of a rise and fall in persistence for PCE in°ation and marginal evidence for
GDP in°ation.
We have used a new Keynesian DSGE model to examine what caused these
changes. We ¯nd evidence that both better policy and better luck { in the form
of less volatile and less persistent cost-push shocks { contributed to improved in°a-
tion outcomes. The enhanced stability of the Fed's long-run in°ation target stands
as key improvement in policy. In our DSGE model, this is the single most important
factor behind the reduction in in°ation volatility and persistence.
The DSGE model treats the in°ation target as an exogenous random process.
Explaining why it drifts is a priority for future research. Our preferred story involves
learning and changing central bank beliefs about the structure of the economy (Cogley
and Sargent 2005b, Primiceri 2006, and Sargent, Williams, and Zha 2006), but more
work is needed to understand this aspect of monetary policy.
A Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm for simu-
lating the VAR posterior





















respectively, where Hst and Hyt are diagonal matrices with univariate stochastic
volatilities along the main diagonal and Bs and By are triangular matrices with
23The MCMC algorithm for the univariate AR is a special case of that for the VAR.
35ones along the main diagonal and static covariance parameters below. The univari-
ate stochastic volatilities are geometric random walks; the vectors ¾s and ¾y list their
innovation variances. The notation xT represents the complete history of xt:
We use a `Metropolis-within-Gibbs' algorithm to simulate the posterior. The






















After substituting Qt for Q; the samplers for the ¯rst four blocks are identical to
those in Cogley and Sargent (2005a); details can be found there. Those for the last
three blocks { which pertain to the state innovation variance Qt { are isomorphic to
the three blocks for the measurement innovation variance Rt: Thus, the appendices
in Cogley and Sargent (2005a) cover those blocks as well.
We executed 100,000 scans of the chain and diagnosed convergence by inspecting
recursive mean plots of the parameters. We discarded the ¯rst 50,000 scans to allow
for burn in. The results reported in the text are based on the remaining 50,000 scans.
A.1 Priors for the VAR
The priors are similar to those in Cogley and Sargent (2005a). We assume that the
hyperparameters and initial value of the drifting parameters are independent across
blocks, so that the joint prior factors into a product of marginal priors. Each of the
marginal priors is selected from a family of natural conjugate priors and is speci¯ed
to proper yet weakly informative.
The unrestricted prior for the initial state is Gaussian,
f(µ0) / N(¹ µ; ¹ P); (31)
where ¹ µ and ¹ P are the OLS point estimate and asymptotic variance, respectively,
based on a training sample covering the period 1948-58. Because the training sample
is short, the asymptotic variance is large, making the prior weakly informative for µ0:
36Priors for the blocks governing Rt are also calibrated to put considerable weight












0 is the estimate of the log of residual variance of variable i from the
preliminary sample. A variance of 10 is huge on a log scale and allows a wide range
of values for hi0. As is the case for µ0, the prior mean for Hy0 is no more than a
ballpark number surrounded by considerable uncertainty.
Similarly, the prior for ¯y is normal with mean zero and a large variance,
f (¯) = N(0;10000 ¢ I): (33)
Lastly, the prior for ¾2




i) = IG(±i=2;1=2); (34)
with scale parameter ± = 0:0001 and degree-of-freedom parameter equal to 1. This
distribution is proper but has fat tails.












where Q0 = °2 ¹ P is calibrated in the same way as in Cogley and Sargent (2005a).
Similarly, the priors for ¯Q and ¾Q have the same form as those for ¯y and ¾y: We
just alter the dimensions so that they conform to HQt instead of HRt: The prior mean
for HQ0 induces only a slight degree of time variation in µt; but in other respects the
priors are su±ciently uninformative that they permit a wide range of outcomes for
Qt.
B Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm for simu-
lating the DSGE posterior
As in An and Schorfheide (2006), we use a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to
simulate the posterior distribution of the coe±cients of the DSGE model. Let yT
denote the set of available data and ® the vector of coe±cients of the DSGE model.
Moreover, let ®(j) denote the jth draw from the posterior of ®. The subsequent draw
is obtained by drawing a candidate value, ~ ®, from a Gaussian proposal distribution










37If the proposal is not accepted, we set ®(j+1) = ®(j).
The posterior distribution for ®, p
¡
®jyT¢
, can be computed multiplying the
prior density by the likelihood function. Because the DSGE model has a linear-
Gaussian state-space representation, the likelihood function can be evaluated using
the prediction-error decomposition and the Kalman ¯lter.
The algorithm is initialized around the posterior mode, found using a standard
maximization algorithm. We set V to the inverse Hessian of the posterior evaluated
at the mode, while s is chosen in order to achieve an acceptance rate approximately
equal to 25 percent. We run two chains of 70,000 draws and discard the ¯rst 20,000
to allow convergence to the ergodic distribution.
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